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INTRODUCTORY NOTE: SYMPOSIUM ON
LAWYERING AND PERSONAL VALUES RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEMS OF
ETHICAL SCHIZOPHRENIA
SAMUEL J. LEVINE*

In recent years, legal practitioners and scholars alike have
identified a growing crisis in the legal profession.! As the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism observed in
1986, "[tihe public views lawyers, at best, as being of uneven
character and quality."2 Not unrelated to the negative public
perception of lawyers, 3 though perhaps more disturbing, is the
Assistant Legal Writing Professor & Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's University School of Law; L.L.M. 1996, Columbia University; Ordination 1996, Yeshiva
University; J.D. 1994, Fordham University; B.A. 1990, Yeshiva University.
Symposium: Lawyering and Personal Values, was inspired in part by a series of
conversations by the same name, conducted in the past year at St. John's University
School of Law. A number of individuals have contributed to the success of the conversations, including John Barrett, Maria Ciampi, Mary Ann Dantuono, Judith Hagley, Father Richard Kehoe, Erica Smith-Klocek, Susan Stabile, and Brian

Tamanaha, many of whom have helped me organize my thoughts for this Introduction.

See, e.g., American Bar Association, Commission on Professionalism, "... In

the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986) [hereinafter, ABA, 1986]; American Bar Association,
Commission on Professionalism, Teaching and Learning Professionalism (1996)
(hereinafter, ABA, 19961; MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW
THE CRISIS INTHE LEGAL PROFESSION is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); Russell G. Pearce, The

ProfessionalismParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessionalIdentity Will Improve
the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1986); Edward D.
Re, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction With the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 85 (1994).
2 ABA, 1986, supra note 1, at 254.
See generally Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of
Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 723 (1994).
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perception lawyers have of themselves. Increasingly, lawyers
feel dissatisfied with the roles they are expected to play and the
conduct demanded of them. In particular, many lawyers see a

widening gap between their personal values and those employed
in legal practice.'

In response to the dichotomy between personal and professional values, some lawyers attempt to develop a corresponding
dichotomy in their personalities, separating the "professional
self' from the "personal self."5 Such a response, however, may
lead to a kind of "ethical schizophrenia," a condition in which an
individual is placed in the position of trying to adhere to competing and inconsistent ethical systems. On an emotional level, this
balance may be difficult to maintain. As Richard Matasar put it,
"split personalities are not necessarily happy ones." On the contrary, he suggests, lawyers attempting to operate under such a

condition are often "masses of contradictions. Something must
give someplace."7 Forced to choose between the two selves, and
the corresponding competing ethical systems, most individuals
can be expected to allow the professional self to prevail. In so

doing, they will, to some degree, adopt into both their characters
and their personal lives the ethical values of their professional
lives.
In addition to the practical problems presented by ethical
schizophrenia, some lawyers may find this condition unaccept-

able in principle. Individuals with aspirations of adhering to a
single set of ethical values must reject the option of trying to
compartmentalize the ethical self into different areas of life. Instead, the same ethical ideals that guide and govern personal life

See Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 75 IOWA L. REV. 975
(1990); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living One Way In Town and Another Way at Home,
31 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (1997). See, e.g., ABA, 1996, supra note 1, at 4 (observing "a
growing sense of dissatisfaction with law practice as being incompatible with personal values and goals"); Russell G. Pearce, Symposium: Foreword: The Religious
Lawyering Movement: An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1998) ([I]ndividual lawyers find themselves unable to
discover a satisfactory way to reconcile their personal and professional aspirations
with what they perceive as the harsh realities of the legal marketplace.").
'See Matasar, supra note 4, at 981-82 (describing the phenomenon of individuals "separat[ing] their private selves from the roles they play as lawyers"); Shaffer,
supra note 4, passim (contrasting conduct of a lawyer "in town," or at work, with
conduct "at home").
Matasar, supra note 4, at 982.
'Id.
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must be maintained in professional life as well. Thus, rather
than allowing the ethically objectionable professional self to influence their character, such individuals will strive and struggle
to conduct their professional lives in a manner consistent with
their personal values. In the words of Thomas Shaffer, an individual "might want to live in the office as he lives at home."8
There exist numerous and varied sources of ethical values
available to lawyers. One such source, potentially common to all
lawyers, is the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1983. Yet, the rules, like other
codes, have been found to be sorely lacking in offering meaningful guidance to lawyers facing difficult ethical questions.
According to Mary Ann Glendon:
[Flormal codes of ethics never aimed at capturing the entire ensemble of understandings that lawyers observe in their dealings
with one another, with clients, and with the courts. The codes
mainly set forth a small body of fairly obvious duties with which
lawyers must comply .... Where ethical problems of great
complexity are concerned, formal canons afford little guidance.
They are often least helpful when most needed.9
Moreover, as Professor Matasar has noted, "ethical rules are
manipulable. The rules set minimum, oft-times flexible, ethical
standards that depend upon a lawyer's good faith. The rules are
subject to a broad range of escape mechanisms."0 Indeed, even
the 1986 ABA Commission on Professionalism, while praising
the implementation of the rules, admitted that "lawyers have...
tended to look at nothing but the rules; if conduct meets the
minimum standard, lawyers tend to ignore exhortations to set
their standards at a higher level.""
As a result of the inadequacy of the rules, lawyers searching
'

Shaffer, supra note 4, at 883.

supra note
note 4,
1, at
'0GLENDON,
Matasar, supra
at 78-79.
977. An additional problem is that, as a result of
flexibility of the rules, "even if a lawyer has personal qualms about conduct, the
lawyer faces strong pressure to act instrumentally when that conduct will benefit
the client and be judged as ethical." Id. at 978. Ironically, then, 'itlo do less is inconsistent with ethical obligations of the profession." Id.
" ABA, 1986, supra note 1, at 259; see also Pearce, supra note 4, at 1081 ("[Tihe
organized bar has not found a successful means of inspiring lawyers to meet their
ethical obligations."); Shaffer, supra note 4, at 882 ("[The town side of a lawyer's
life, at least since the days of the robber barons, has invoked an exalted set of grand
words while it lived by a consistently crude set of professional rules that would not,
and did not, get in the way of getting ahead.").
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for ethical guidance have looked to other sources of values. Religious values, in particular, have gained increasing prominence
in the arena of legal ethics, as they present a comprehensive system of ethics for lawyers seeking to integrate their personal and
professional lives.12 Many religious systems reject the notion of
restricting ethical values and behavior to specific areas of life
while allowing other parts of life to remain bereft of such values.
In describing Judaism, for example, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik
has emphasized that an individual "stands before God not only
in the synagogue but also in the public domain, in his house,
while on a journey, while lying down and rising up." 3 Thus,
Jewish thought does not accept the "strange, obscure, psychic
dualism" through which "[tihe man in the sanctuary and the
man in the marketplace are two separate and distinct personalities who have absolutely nothing in common with one another.""
Similarly, Rabbi Yitzchak Hutner urged his students to strive to
live a "broad life," integrating their profession with their values,
rather than a "double life," which would involve separating the
personal self from the professional self.'
The success of religious values in responding to the ethical
needs and problems of lawyers has resulted in what Russell
Pearce has called a "religious lawyering movement."" Professor
Pearce documents the early history of the "movement," leading
up to two recent symposia exploring the relationship between
religious values and lawyering."7 In 1996, Professors Thomas
Baker and Timothy Floyd organized the Faith and the Law
Symposium" in the Texas Tech Law Review, asking "lawyers,
judges and law professors... to reflect on how they have reconSee generally Pearce, supra note 4.
"JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN 93 (Lawrence Kaplan trans., 1983)
(originally published in Hebrew as Ish ha-halakhah,in I TALPIOT 3-4 (1944)).
Id. at 92-93 (Judaism "does not compartmentalize reality" and rejects "{tlhe
strange, disturbing dualism... grounded in the fragmentation of life into many different sectors ...a deep fissure in one's psychic identity... a personality split ...a
spiritual schizophrenia").
'5YITZCHAK HUTNER, PACHAD YITZCHOK, LETrERS AND WRITINGS No. 94 (1991).
See generally Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating
Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1199 (1996). Cf
Shaffer, supra note 4, at 884 ("The late Christian lawyer William Stringfelow...
said he avoided thinking of himself as a 'professional.' He was, he said, a biblical
person who worked as a lawyer.").
See Pearce, supra note 4.
" See id. at 1075-77.
"Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 911 (1996).

INTRODUCTION

ciled their professional life with their faith life."' The symposium consisted of "essays in the nature of personal narratives,
exercises in storytelling, which might inform and perhaps inspire
others.""
For three days in June of 1997, organizers of "The Relevance
of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Conference," at
Fordham University School of Law, brought together "lawyers,
legal scholars, clergy, and theologians.., to examine the implications of religion for lawyers."'
The conference proceedings,
published in the Fordham Law Review,' include "a scholarly literature which ... address[es] systematically the range of theoretical issues raised by the existing religious lawyering literature," as well as "agendas for further scholarship, teaching, bar
programs, and congregational activities."23
The present issue of The Catholic Lawyer, devoted to a
Symposium: Lawyering and Personal Values, aims to continue
these conversations, recognizing the important role that religious
and other ethical values can play in the lives of lawyers. This issue presents a variety of perspectives, all of which share a common goal of promoting personal values in the legal profession.
Daniel 0. Conkle, a law professor, provides an analytical
framework illustrating various ways lawyers that he interviewed, whom he calls "Professing Professionals: Christian Pilots
on the River of Law," have integrated their personal and professional lives. James W. Perkins, a practicing lawyer for more
than four decades, documents the ethical crisis in the legal profession and explores the relationship between "Virtues and the
Lawyer," suggesting "virtue ethics" as an alternative to rules.
Professor Charles J. Russo describes how his academic career led
him to pursue justice in Bosnia, "At the Table in Sarajevo: Reflections on Ethnic Segregation in Bosnia," and he calls on law
schools and lawyers to emphasize human rights. Finally, Stanley Morris, a practicing attorney in Colorado for more than
twenty-seven years who has seen "The View From Main Street,"
describes a decline in the sense of values held by lawyers and
"9Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd, A Symposium Precis, 27 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 911 (1996).
20 id.

Pearce, supra note 4, at 1075.
22Symposium: The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An Interfaith Con21

ference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1988).
2 Pearce, supra note 4, at 1077.
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advocates internalization of ethical values as a way to reverse
that decline.
The contributors to this symposium thus provide a number
of approaches and viewpoints, based in various value systems, in
an effort to combat the current ethical crisis felt by so many lawyers. Through different methods, but sharing a common emphasis on personal values, they offer a variety of responses to the
problems of ethical schizophrenia that continue to plague the legal profession.

